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1 Introduction
Considering the following scenario. The gateway of an
organisation rejects any inbound traffic unless a message is
indeed for at least one member in the organisation. In this
scenario, the gateway might not be regarded as honest in terms
of whom the intended receiver(s) would be. It could be a case
that an agent who works for the organisation sends an inbound
encrypted message to the organisation, where only the agent
knows the receivers. In this scenario, a sender outside the
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organisation should be able to make sure that a message for
target receivers inside the organisation will not be rejected
by the gateway while maintaining the message confidentiality
and receiver anonymity. To ensure the maximal security, we
should also consider that the gateway could potentially collude
with the corrupted receivers, who will leak all the personal
information related to their identities in order to compromise
other users.
In order to define a model for the above scenario, we
propose a framework in which one can design a protocol
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among three parties (the sender, the gateway and the receivers)
to protect both the message content and the privacy of
receivers. We apply a technique, where each member in the
organisation sends a ‘trapdoor’ related to its private key and
identifier, to the gateway through a public channel, so that the
gateway can use this piece of information to verify whether
the receivers belong to the organisation. The trapdoor does not
disclose any personal information, as it is encrypted; however,
the gateway can blindly verify the identifier embedded in
the trapdoor. We call the method as public key encryption
and identity search (PKEIS). In order to achieve this feature
we need an anonymous encryption scheme, addressing the
issue of receiver privacy. Specifically speaking, a designated
receiver can only be sure that he is one of receivers of
the message and learns nothing about other receivers of the
message. On the other hand, it is computationally hard for
the gateway to distinguish the relationship between a public
key and a trapdoor by combining the ciphertext and trapdoors
together without the private keys of receivers.
The most challenging aspect of a gateway-based verifiable
and anonymous broadcast scheme is preventing collusion.
Unlike conventional broadcast encryption, collusion attacks
in our model are much more complicated:
•

the gateway may collude with corrupted receivers, who
provide their personal information (such as private key,
identity token, trapdoor), to obtain the message content

•

the gateway may collude with the corrupted receivers to
guess the identities of privileged receivers

•

the gateway may collude with corrupted receivers to
discern the relations between the ciphertexts and the
trapdoors involved.

For example, suppose R1 , . . . , Rt are some privileged
receivers, and R1′ , . . . , Rt′ are some non-privileged receivers.
In our model, the gateway, with the help of receivers S ⊂
{R1 , . . . , Rt }, should not be able to confirm who else
can decrypt the ciphertext; meanwhile, with the help of
receivers S ⊂ {R1′ , . . . , Rt′ }, should not be able to decrypt
the ciphertext or obtain the information about the receivers
involved in the ciphertext.
We require the following security notions which capture
dishonest behaviours of the sender, the gateway and the
receivers, respectively.
•

The confidentiality of the message (or semantic security
of the message). Confidentiality here means that the
gateway cannot obtain any information about the
plaintext from the ciphertext, even if it colludes with the
non-privileged receivers.

•

The anonymity of the receivers. Anonymity here means
that the gateway cannot know who will be the
privileged receivers from the ciphertext, even if it
colludes with the corrupted receivers, which also
implies that the gateway cannot distinguish the relations
between the ciphertexts and the trapdoors with the
information it obtains from the corrupted receivers.
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Assume that the collusion is among t1 non-privileged receivers
and t2 privileged receivers. With the above security notions,
breaking into the gateway would neither help t1 nonprivileged receivers to gain any information about the message
and identity information of the privileged receivers, nor t2
privileged receivers to obtain the identity information of other
members who receive the same message.
A related but not closely related work is verifiable
encryption. Verifiable encryption has the property that the
validity of ciphertext can be verified without knowledge of
private key, and it has been used for fair exchange (Asokan
et al., 1998; Bao, 1998), key escrow schemes (Poupard and
Stern, 2000), signature sharing schemes (Franklin and Reiter,
1995) and publicly verifiable secret sharing (Stadler, 1996).
The concept of verifiable encryption was first introduced
by Stadler (1996) with the cut-and-choose methodology in
the context of publicly verifiable sharing schemes in 1996.
Then, Asokan et al. (1998) proposed a more general form of
verifiable encryption with perfect separability for the purpose
of fair exchange of signatures in 1998. Bao (1998) gave
a verifiable encryption scheme without using the cut-andchoose methodology, but it failed to provide semantic security
(Goldwasser and Micali, 1984). Camenisch and Lysyanskaya
(2001) proposed an anonymous verifiable encryption scheme
which did not use the cut-and-choose methodology in 2001,
but the prover needs to know the private key of the
receiver. Camenisch and Shoup (2003) introduced a verifiable
encryption system that provides chosen ciphertext security and
avoids inefficient cut-and-choose proofs in 2003; however, it
requires to use Paillier encryption function (Paillier, 1999).
Broadcast encryption (BE) is designed to address the
problem of broadcasting a message to an arbitrary subset
S from a universe of receivers U who are listening on a
broadcast channel. Since it was introduced by Fiat and Naor
(1993) in 1993, various BE schemes have been proposed
(Boneh et al., 2005; Delerabl et al., 2007; Delerablée, 2007;
Dodis and Fazio, 2002; Fiat and Naor, 1993; Gentry and
Waters, 2009) from different aspects such as strength of
security notions, public and private key storage requirements,
ciphertext length, computational costs, and so on. Concerning
making ciphertexts to be as short as possible, schemes in
Boneh et al. (2005) and Gentry and Waters (2009) are close to
optimal. With regard to the privacy of receivers, (Barth et al.,
2006) first considered privacy of users in broadcast encryption
under the context of encryption systems, Then Libert et al.
(2011) gave a generalised and unified security definition for
anonymous broadcast encryption.
Private information retrieval (PIR) protocols introduced
by Chor et al. (1995) allow users to retrieve some data items
or search some data items from a public database without
revealing to the database administrator which items they
retrieve or search, but the data should be public. Boneh et al.
(2004) proposed public key encryption with keyword search
(PEKS) to enable one, say Alice, to provide a key to the
gateway such that the gateway can test whether the word
‘urgent’ (or other words) is a keyword in the e-mail without
learning anything else about the e-mail, but it needs a secure
channel between Alice and the e-mail server. In order to solve
this problem, Baek et al. (2008) provided a secure channel
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free public key encryption with keyword search (SCF-PEKS)
scheme.
Motivated by the above work, we propose a cryptographic
system: public key encryption and identity search to solve
our problem, such that the gateway could check whether the
identities tokens (not the data items or keywords) used in the
broadcast encryption are from the data stored by the gateway.
We introduce a new primitive called gateway-based verifiable
and anonymous broadcast encryption which would make the
gateway allow a sender to transmit some messages to multiple
receivers remaining perfectly confidential and anonymous.
Specifically, this primitive provides confidentiality of the
plaintext and anonymity of privileged receivers while
preventing collusion attacks between the gateway and the
corrupted receivers.
In order to provide a secure, verifiable and anonymous
broadcast encryption scheme, we propose a notion called
public key encryption and identity search (PKEIS), with which
we can design a secure framework for our problem. In this
construction, there is a third party authority centre (AC) to
generate a public key and private key pair for the gateway
and assign every potential receiver a secret identity token,
whilst the receivers generate their own public and private key
pairs. More specifically speaking, when Alice wants to send a
message to Bob, John and so on, she encrypts her message with
PKEIS algorithm to generate the ciphertext composed of two
parts: encryption of the message and verification of receivers’
identity tokens. The gateway checks whether the message is
for the members in the organisation with the verification part
while the privileged receivers decrypt the ciphertext to gain
the plaintext with the encryption part.
Our construction for gateway-based verifiable and
anonymous broadcast encryption protects the confidentiality
of message content and privacy of privileged receivers
according to a formal model which we specify. It provides the
additional property: collusion resistance, which means that the
gateway cannot learn any information about the message if it
colludes with t1 non-privileged receivers; besides, it cannot
learn any information about the privacy of privileged receivers
if it colludes with t2 privileged receivers. Briefly speaking, the
gateway learns nothing from the ciphertext even if it colludes
with corrupted receivers.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.
In Section 2, we describe the framework and security
model of gateway-based verifiable and anonymous broadcast
encryption. In Section 3, we review the conception of
bilinear pairings and the related complexity assumptions.
In Section 4, we provide an efficient instantiation according
to the formal framework of gateway-based verifiable and
anonymous broadcast encryption, as well as its security proof
based on the BDH complexity assumptions and an application.
In Section 5, we conclude the contributions in this paper and
leave some open problems.

encryption. We describe the adversary model and games
between an adversary and a challenger.

2.1 Definition
In gateway-based verifiable and anonymous broadcast
encryption, three parties are involved: sender, receivers, and
gateway. Every receiver generates a trapdoor according to
its identity token and sends it to the gateway. The sender
generates and sends encrypted message which we call ‘PKEIS
ciphertext’. The gateway receives PKEIS ciphertext and
performs verification according to the trapdoors received from
the receivers. If the ciphertext passes the verification, the
gateway broadcasts the ciphertext; otherwise, it rejects the
ciphertext.
In our framework, every receiver Ri generates its own
public and private key pair (pkRi , skRi ). An authority centre
(AC) provides an identity token IDi for every potential
receiver Ri and a public and private key pair (pkG , skG )
for gateway G. Every receiver Ri generates a trapdoor Ti
on identity token IDi with private key skRi and sends this
trapdoor to gateway G. Gateway G maintains a trapdoor list
LT , whenever it receives a trapdoor from a receiver Ri , it adds
this trapdoor to LT . With the private key skG and the trapdoor
list LT , gateway G can verify the ciphertext and determine
whether to broadcast it or not.
A gateway-based verifiable and anonymous broadcast
encryption scheme is specified by seven randomised
algorithms: Setup, Make-GKey, Make-RKey, Encrypt, Verify
and Decrypt.
•

Setup(k): Taking a security parameter k as input, this
algorithm outputs a common parameter params.

•

Make-GKey(params): Taking the public parameter
params as input, this algorithm outputs the public and
private key pair (pkG , skG ) for gateway G.

•

Make-RKey(params): Taking the public parameter
params as input, this algorithm outputs the public and
private key pair (pkRi , skRi ) for receiver Ri .

•

Trapdoor(params, skRi , IDi ): Taking the public
parameter params, the secret key skRi and the identity
token IDi of the receiver Ri as input, this algorithm
outputs the trapdoor Ti for IDi .
Receiver Ri sends its trapdoor Ti to gateway G through
a public broadcast channel. Once gateway G receives a
trapdoor Ti , it will add Ti to the trapdoor list LT which
is initially empty.

•

Encrypt(params, M , pkG , P K, IDi ): Taking the
public parameter params, the message M , the public
key pkG of gateway G, the public keys pkR1 , . . ., pkRt
and the corresponding identity tokens ID1 , . . . , IDt of
receivers R1 , . . . , Rt as input, this algorithm outputs the
ciphertext C.

•

Verify(params, skG , LT , C): Taking the public
parameter params, the private key skG of gateway G,
the trapdoor list LT for all the receivers, and the

2 Preliminaries
In this section, we first present a formal framework of our
primitive: gateway-based verifiable and anonymous broadcast
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corresponding private key, identity token, and trapdoor
in a 3-tuple (skRi , IDi , Ti ).

ciphertext C as input, this algorithm outputs C in case
of success or ⊥ in case of failure.
•

Decrypt(params, skRi , Ti , C): Taking the public
parameter params, the private key skRi and the
trapdoor Ti of the receiver Ri , and the ciphertext C as
input, this algorithm outputs the message M in case of
being a member of privileged receivers or ⊥ in case of
being a member of non-privileged receivers.

Let S be the recipient set, we require that our system is
correct, meaning that for all Ri ∈ S, if params ← Setup(k),
(pkG , skG ) ← Make-GKey(params), (pkRi , skRi ) ←
Make-RKey(params), Ti ← Trapdoor(params, skRi , IDi ),
C ← Encrypt(params, M , pkG , pkRi , IDi ), and C ←
Verify(params, skG , LT , C), then M = Decrypt(params,
skRi , Ti , C).

Confidentiality. We define a chosen plaintext attack
for gateway-based verifiable and anonymous broadcast
encryption to ensure the confidentiality of the message
content. More precisely, confidentiality is defined using a
game between an adversary algorithm A and a challenger
algorithm B that algorithm A cannot distinguish a ciphertext
intended for one message from a ciphertext intended for
another message.
•

Initialisation. Algorithm B runs Setup to obtain the
public parameter params. Then, algorithm B generates
the public and private key pair (pkG , skG ) for gateway
G. Algorithm B gives the public parameter params, the
public and private key pair (pkG , skG ) to algorithm A.
For every receiver Ri where i = 1, . . . , n, algorithm B
generates a public and private key pair (pkRi , skRi ).
Algorithm B gives their public keys pkRi to
algorithm A while keeping their private keys skRi
secret.

•

Query Phase 1. Algorithm A adaptively issues
Receiver_Corrupt query on pkRi . Algorithm B forwards
the corresponding private key, identity token, and
trapdoor in a 3-tuple (skRi , IDi , Ti ) to algorithm A.

•

Query Phase 2. Algorithm A issues Gateway_Corrupt
query on P K = {pkR1 , . . ., pkRn }. Algorithm B
forwards the trapdoor list LT = {T1 , . . ., Tn } to
algorithm A.
Note that algorithm A knows nothing about the
relations between the public key pkRi and the trapdoor
Ti except those in the list LCR .

•

Challenge. When algorithm A decides that Phase 2 is
over, it outputs two messages M0∗ , M1∗ , a public key set
P K ∗ ⊂ P K on which it wishes to be challenged. The
only constraint is that pkRi ∈ P K ∗ did not appear in
Phase 1. To generate the challenge ciphertext,
algorithm B chooses a random bit γ ∈ {0, 1}, and runs
Encrypt on Mγ∗ to obtain the ciphertext C ∗ . It sends C ∗
as the ciphertext to algorithm A.

•

Query Phase 3. A continues to adaptively issue
Receiver_Corrupt query on pkRi of which
pkRi ∈
/ P K ∗ , as in Phase 1.

•

Guess. A outputs its guess γ ′ ∈ {0, 1} for γ and wins
the game if γ = γ ′ .

2.2 Security model
The goal of a gateway-based verifiable and anonymous
broadcast encryption scheme is to send a message to multiple
receivers under the verification of the gateway while keeping
the confidentiality of the message content and the anonymity
of the receivers. In a gateway-based verifiable and anonymous
broadcast encryption protocol, which involves three parties:
a sender, a gateway and the potential receivers, collusion
resistance have to be dealt with:
•

a collusion of the corrupted receivers and the gateway
may help the adversary to recover the message from the
ciphertext

•

a collusion of the corrupted receivers and the gateway
may help the adversary to identify the identity tokens of
the privileged receivers

•

a collusion of the corrupted receivers and the gateway
may help the adversary to discern the trapdoors
involved in the ciphertext.

In our security model, collusion will be modelled by Corrupt
queries, which will provide all the secret data of the gateway
and the corrupted receivers to the adversary. Then, from all
these information, the adversary will be allowed to do anything
it wants to transfer some information.
As a consequence, we provide the adversary with two
Corrupt oracles in the security model assuming that the
adversary has known the public keys of receivers in the system:
a Gateway_Corrupt oracle that outputs the trapdoor list stored
by the gateway, and a Receiver_Corrupt oracle that outputs the
related information (including public key, private key, identity
token, trapdoor) of corrupted receiver Ri . We denote all the
public keys of potential receivers by P K, and the corruption
list of corrupted receivers by LCR .
•

•

Gateway_Corrupt(P K) → LT , takes the public key set
P K as input, this algorithm outputs all the trapdoors in
LT .
Receiver_Corrupt(pkRi ) → (skRi , IDi , Ti ), takes the
public key pkRi as input, this algorithm outputs the
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We refer to such an adversary algorithm A as an
IND-CPA adversary. We define the advantage of the
adversary algorithm A in attacking a gateway-based
verifiable and anonymous broadcast encryption scheme ε =
(Setup, Make-GKey, Make-RKey, Trapdoor, Encrypt, Verify,
Decrypt) as
Advε,A = |Pr[γ = γ ′ ] − 1/2|
The probability is over the random bits used by the challenger
and the adversary.
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Definition 1: We say that a gateway-based verifiable and
anonymous broadcast encryption scheme ε is (t, qT , ϵ)-INDCPA secure if for any IND-CPA adversary algorithm A that
runs in time t, makes at most qT Receiver_Corrupt queries,
we have that Advε,A < ϵ.
There is another stronger version of security, the chosen
ciphertext security, where the adversary is not only allowed to
issue adaptive Receiver_Corrupt queries, but also allowed to
issue decryption queries.
Definition 2: We say that a gateway-based verifiable and
anonymous broadcast encryption scheme ε is (t, qT , ϵ)-INDCPA secure if ε is (t, qT , 0, ϵ)-IND-CCA2 secure.
Anonymity. We define the following game to ensure that the
adversary cannot distinguish a ciphertext intended for one
recipient set from a ciphertext intended for another recipient
set. More precisely, receiver anonymity is defined using a
game between an adversary algorithm A and a challenger
algorithm B.
•

•

•

•

Initialisation. Algorithm B runs Setup to obtain the
public parameter params. Then, algorithm B generates
the public and private key pair (pkG , skG ) for gateway
G. Algorithm B gives the public parameter params, the
public and private key pair (pkG , skG ) to algorithm A.
For every receiver Ri where i = 1, . . . , n, algorithm B
generates an identity token IDi , a public and private
key pair (IDi , pkRi , skRi ) as well as the trapdoor Ti .
Algorithm B gives their public keys (pkRi ) to
algorithm A.
item Query Phase 1. Algorithm A adaptively issues
Receiver_Corrupt query on pkRi . Algorithm B forwards
the corresponding private key, identity token, and
trapdoor in a 3-tuple (skRi , IDi , Ti ) to algorithm A.
Query Phase 2. Algorithm A issues Gateway_Corrupt
query on P K = {pkR1 , . . ., pkRn }. Algorithm B
forwards the trapdoor list LT = {T1 , . . ., Tn } to
algorithm A.
Note that algorithm A knows nothing about the
relations between the public key pkRi and the trapdoor
Ti except those in the list LCR .
Challenge. When algorithm A decides that Phase 2 is
over, it outputs a messages M ∗ , and two public key sets
P K0∗ , P K1∗ ⊂ P K on which it wishes to be challenged
where P K0∗ , P K1∗ are of equal size l. The only
constraint is that none of the pkRi ∈ P K0∗ ∪ P K1∗
appeared in Phase 1. To generate the challenge
ciphertext, algorithm B retrieves the corresponding
identity token sets S0∗ , S1∗ ⊂ {ID1 , . . . , IDn } of equal
size l, and them chooses a random bit γ ∈ {0, 1}, and
runs Encrypt on P Kγ∗ , Sγ∗ to obtain the ciphertext C ∗ . It
sends C ∗ as the ciphertext to algorithm A.
Query Phase 3. A continues to adaptively issue
Receiver_Corrupt query on pkRi , as in Phase 1.

•

Guess. A outputs its guess γ ′ ∈ {0, 1} for γ and wins
the game if γ = γ ′ .

We refer to such an adversary algorithm A as an ANONIND-CPA adversary. We define the advantage of the adversary
algorithm A in attacking a gateway-based verifiable and
anonymous broadcast encryption scheme ε = (Setup, MakeGKey, Make-RKey, Trapdoor, Encrypt, Verify, Decrypt) as
Advε,A = |Pr[γ = γ ′ ] − 1/2| .
The probability is over the random bits used by the challenger
and the adversary.
Definition 3: We say that a gateway-based verifiable and
anonymous broadcast encryption scheme ε is (t, qT ,
ϵ)-ANON-IND-CPA secure if for any ANON-IND-CPA
adversary algorithm A that runs in time t, makes qT
Receiver_Corrupte query, we have that Advε,A < ϵ.
There is another stronger version of security, the chosen
ciphertext security, where the adversary is not only allowed to
issue adaptive Receiver_Corrupt queries, but also allowed to
issue decryption queries.
Definition 4: We say that a gateway-based verifiable and
anonymous broadcast encryption scheme ε is (t, qT , ϵ)ANON-IND-CPA secure if ε is (t, qT , 0, ϵ)-ANON-INDCCA2 secure.

3 Bilinear pairings and complexity assumptions
In this section, we review the definitions of bilinear
pairings and bilinear pairing groups, and the computational
assumptions related to bilinear pairings that are relevant to the
protocol we discuss in this paper.

3.1 Notations
If n is a positive integer, we use [n] to denote the set {1, . . . , n}.

3.2 Bilinear pairings
Let G and Ĝ be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime
order q. Let g be a generator of G and ĝ be a generator of Ĝ,
we define ê : G × Ĝ → GT to be a bilinear map if it has the
following properties (?):
•

Bilinear: for all g ∈ G, ĝ ∈ Ĝ and a, b ∈ Z, we have
ê(g a , ĝ b ) = ê(g, ĝ)ab .

•

Non-degenerate: ê(g, ĝ) ̸= 1.

We say that (G, Ĝ) is a bilinear group if the group action in
(G, Ĝ) can be computed efficiently and there exists a group
GT and an efficiently computable bilinear map ê : G × Ĝ →
GT as above.
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3.3 Complexity assumptions
Computational DL. We say that an algorithm A has advantage
AdvDL
A = ϵ in solving the computational discrete log (DL)
problem in G if
Pr[A(g, g a ) = a] ≥ ϵ
where the probability is over the random choice of generators
g of G, the random choice of exponent a in Zp∗ , and the random
bits used by algorithm A.
Computational DL Oracle OgDL . This oracle is defined over
a cyclic group G = ⟨g⟩. On input a value Y ∈ G, this oracle
outputs a ∈ Z|G| such that Y = g a .
We make use of the generalisation of the Bilinear DiffieHellman assumptions in Boneh and Boyen (2011), which
includes a class of assumptions appearing with various
pairing-based schemes.
Computational BDH. We say that an algorithm A has
advantage AdvBDH
= ϵ in solving the computational BDH
A
problem in (G, Ĝ) if
Pr[A(g, g a , g b , ĝ, ĝ a , ĝ c ) = ê(g, ĝ)abc ] ≥ ϵ
where the probability is over the random choice of generators
g of G and ĝ of Ĝ, the random choice of exponents a, b, c in
Zp∗ , and the random bits used by algorithm A.
Decisional BDH. We say that an algorithm A that outputs
a bit γ ∈ {0, 1} has advantage AdvD-BDH
= ϵ in solving the
A
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem in (G, Ĝ)
if
Pr[A(g, g a , g b , ĝ, ĝ a , ĝ c , ê(g, ĝ)abc ) = 0] −
Pr[A(g, g a , g b , ĝ, ĝ a , ĝ c , Z) = 0] ≥ ϵ
where the probability is over the random choice of generators
g of G and ĝ of Ĝ, the random choice of exponents a, b, c in
Zp∗ , the random choice of Z ∈ GT , and the random bits used
by algorithm A.
We also define a variant version of computational BDH
assumption and decisional BDH assumption, respectively.
Computational X-BDH. We say that an algorithm A has
advantage AdvXBDH
= ϵ in solving the computational X-BDH
A
problem in (G, Ĝ) if
Pr[A(g, g a , {g bi }i∈[n] , ĝ, ĝ a , ĝ c , OgDL ) =
{ê(g, ĝ)abk c }k∈L , L}] ≥ ϵ
where L ⊂ [n] and all inputs to OgDL belongs to the set
{g bi }i∈[n]\L . The probability is over the random choice of
generators g of G and ĝ of Ĝ, the random choice of exponents
a, {bi }i∈[n] , c in Zp∗ , and the random bits used by algorithm A.
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Decisional X-BDH. We say that an algorithm A outputs a
bit γ ∈ {0, 1} has advantage AdvD-XBDH
= ϵ in solving the
A
Decisional X-BDH problem in (G, Ĝ) if
(st, L) ← A(g, g a , {g bi }i∈[n] , ĝ, ĝ a , ĝ c , OgDL ),
Pr[A(st, OgDL , {ê(g, ĝ)abk c }k∈L ) = 0] −
Pr[A(st, OgDL , {Zk }k∈L ) = 0] ≥ ϵ
where L ⊂ [n], and all inputs to OgDL belongs to the set
{g bi }i∈[n]\L . The probability is over the random choice of
generators g of G and ĝ of Ĝ, the random choice of exponents
a, {bi }i∈[n] , c in Zp∗ , the random choice of {Zk }li=1 ∈ GT ,
and the random bits used by algorithm A.
In the decisional BDH assumption, we refer to the
distribution over G3 × Ĝ3 × GT of the 7-tuple in the true
instance (on the left) as PDBDH , and in the false instance (on
the right) as RDBDH .
Similarly, in the decisional X-BDH assumption, we
refer to the distribution of (g, g a , {g bi }i∈[n] }, ĝ, ĝ a , ĝ c ,
|L|

{ê(g, ĝ)abk c }k∈L ) over Gn+2 × Ĝ3 × GT as PXBDH , and
the distribution on the right as RXBDH .
Definition 5: We say that the (t, ϵ)-Decisional BDH
assumption holds in (G, Ĝ) if no t-time algorithm has
advantage at least ϵ in solving the Decisional BDH problem
in (G, Ĝ).
Similarly, we say that the (t, ϵ)-Decisional X-BDH
assumption holds in (G, Ĝ) if no t-time algorithm has
advantage at least ϵ in solving the Decisional X-BDH problem
in (G, Ĝ).

4 Proposed scheme
In this section, we give a secure gateway-based verifiable and
anonymous broadcast encryption scheme. We also provide
a security proof for this scheme in the random oracle
model.

4.1 Description
Suppose that there are a gateway G and a recipient set S
= {R1 , . . . , Rn } in the system. The AC assigns an identity
token IDi for receiver Ri where i = 1, . . . , n, and a public
and private key pair (pkG , skG ) for gateway G. Receiver
Ri generates its public and private key pair (pkRi , skRi ), it
publishes the public key pkRi while keeping the private key
skRi secret. After that, receiver Ri computes its trapdoor Ti
corresponding to identity IDi with private key skRi , and sends
Ti to gateway G. Every time gateway G receives a trapdoor Ti ,
it will add Ti to the trapdoor list LT . When gateway G receives
an outside ciphertext, it checks whether this message is for
some inside receivers (Ri ∈ S) with its private key skG and the
trapdoor list LT . If so, gateway G broadcasts this ciphertext;
otherwise, it rejects and outputs ⊥.
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Our gateway-based verifiable and anonymous broadcast
encryption scheme consists of the following seven algorithms.
•

Setup(k): This algorithm takes a security parameter k
as input. It chooses two groups G, Ĝ of prime order
q ≥ 2k . It constructs a bilinear pairing ê : G × Ĝ →
GT . It defines a hash function H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Ĝ. It
outputs params = (G, Ĝ, GT , q, ê, g, ĝ, H1 ) as the
public parameter where g ∈ G.

•

Make-GKey(params): This algorithm takes the public
parameter params as input. It chooses x ∈ Zp∗
uniformly at random and computes X = g x . It outputs
the public and private key pair (pkG , skG ) = (X, x) for
gateway G.

•

Make-RKey(params): This algorithm takes the public
parameter params as input. For i = 1, . . . , n, it
chooses yi ∈ Zp∗ uniformly at random and computes Yi
= g yi . It outputs the public and private key pair (pkRi ,
skRi ) = (Yi , yi ) for receiver Ri .

•

Trapdoor(params, skRi , IDi ): This algorithm takes
the public parameter params, and the secret key skRi
and the identity token IDi of receiver Ri as input. It
computes Ti = H1 (IDi )yi where i = 1, . . . , n. It
outputs Ti as the trapdoor for receiver Ri .

•

Encrypt(params, M , pkG , {pkRi , IDi }i∈L ): This
algorithm takes the public parameter params, the
message M ∈ GT , the public key pkG of the gateway,
and the set of recipients’ public key and identity token
{Yi , IDi }i∈L as input. It chooses r ∈ Zp∗ and computes
{C1,i = M · ê(Yi , ĝ)r }i∈L , C2 = g r , {C3,i =
ê(X, ĝ)r · ê(Yi , H1 (IDi ))r }i∈L . It outputs C =
({C1,i }i∈L , C2 , {C3,i }i∈L ) as the ciphertext.

•

Verify(params, skG , LT , C): This algorithm takes the
public parameter params, the secret key skG of
gateway G and the trapdoor list LT and a ciphertext C
as input. It parses the ciphertext as C1,i , C2 , C3,i for
i = 1 to K. Next, it checks whether there exists a
trapdoor T ∈ LT such that ê(C2 , ĝ x · T ) = C3,i for all
i = 1 to K. If all the equation holds, it outputs the
ciphertext C.

•

Decrypt(params, skRi , Ti , C): This algorithm takes
the public parameter params, the secret key skRi and
the trapdoor Ti of receiver Ri , and the ciphertext C as
input. If receiver Ri is a privileged receiver, it outputs
M = C1,i · ê(C2 , ĝ −yi ). Otherwise, it outputs a failure
symbol ⊥.

Efficiency. Our scheme achieves O(1)-size public keys and
O(n)-size ciphertexts and constant size private keys. Note
that the ciphertext is linear in the size of S, and not in the
maximal number of decryption keys that can be distributed.
Besides, because ê(Yi , ĝ), ê(X, ĝ) and ê(Yi , H1 (IDi )) can
be pre-computed, pairing computations are greatly reduced.
In our scheme, encryption needs no pairing computation and
2 · t + 2 exponentiation computation while decryption needs
one pairing computation and one exponentiation computation.

4.2 Security analysis
We present the security reduction of our gateway-based
verifiable and anonymous broadcast encryption scheme by
showing that it is secure under the games defined in
Section 2.
In our scheme, public keys of receiver Ri and gateway G
will be publicised to all the involved parties, while identity
token IDi of receiver Ri generated by the AC is known to
receiver Ri and the outside sender, private key skRi of receiver
Ri generated by receiver Ri is only known to receiver Ri ,
private key skG of gateway G generated by the AC is known
to gateway G, and trapdoor Ti of receiver Ri generated by
receiver Ri is known to gateway G and receiver Ri . Note that
only receiver Ri knows the relations between its public key
pkRi , private key skRi and trapdoor Ti .
Theorem 1: The above scheme is confidential assuming that
the Decisional (t, ϵ) X-BDH assumption holds in (G, Ĝ).
Proof: Suppose there exists a (t, ϵ)-algorithm A against
the confidentiality of our gateway-based verifiable and
anonymous broadcast scheme. Algorithm A may get the help
from gateway G and qT corrupted receivers. The former will
give its public and private key pair (pkG , skG ) and answer
the Gateway_Corrupt query on the public key sets P K =
{pkRi }i∈L , and the latter will answer the Receiver_Corrupt
query on pkRi .
Thus, we construct an algorithm B that solves the
Decisional (t, ϵ) X-BDH problem. Specifically, algorithm B
is given (g, g a , {g bi }i∈[n] , ĝ, ĝ a , ĝ c , ODL ) and the definition
of G, Ĝ, GT together with the bilinear map ê as the problem
instance. Recalled that at some point algorithm B have to
output a set L∗ ⊂ [n] and receives a set {Zk }k∈L∗ . We
defer the description of this step later. Based on the problem
instance, algorithm B creates the system parameter as follows.
Initialisation. The system parameter is generated base on the
problem instance. Algorithm B sets ĝ ′ = ĝ c , and
•

outputs params = (G, Ĝ, GT , q, ê, g, ĝ ′ , H1 ) as the
public parameter, where H1 is a random oracle
controlled by algorithm B.

•

generates n identity tokens ID1 , . . . , IDn , and sets a
corruption list LCR which is initially empty.

•

chooses x ∈ Zp∗ uniformly at random and computes X
= g x . It outputs (pkG , skG ) = (X, x) as the public and
private key pair of gateway G.

•

outputs P K = {g b1 , . . . , g bn } = {Y1 , . . . , Yn } as the
public keys of n potential receivers R1 , . . . , Rn .

Phase 1. Algorithm A queries pkRi to the Receiver_Corrupt
oracle, algorithm B
•

issues a query to oracle OgDL on input Yi and obtains the
value bi such that Yi = g bi .

•

computes the trapdoor Ti = H1 (IDi )bi .
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•

outputs the corresponding private key, identity token
and trapdoor in a 3-tuple (skRi , IDi , Ti ) = (bi , IDi ,
H1 (IDi )bi ) as the answer.

•

updates the corruption list LCR with (pkRi , skRi , IDi ,
Ti ).

Phase 2. Algorithm A queries P K = {pkR1 , . . . , pkRn } to
the Gateway_Corrupt oracle. Algorithm B
•

chooses ri ∈ Zp∗ , and computes Ti = ĝ ′ri .

•

outputs all the trapdoors {T1 , . . . , Tn } to algorithm A.

Note that algorithm B has implicitly assumed H1 (IDi )
= ĝ ′ri /bi . If algorithm A query IDi without issuing
Receiver_Corrupt query on Yi , algorithm B aborts. This
happens with negligible probability since the value IDi is
hidden from algorithm A if the corrupt query on Yi is not
issued. Otherwise, algorithm B returns ĝ ′ri /bi as the hash value
of IDi . Thus, simulation is perfect in the random oracle model.
Challenge. Algorithm A outputs two messages M0∗ , M1∗ ∈
GT , and a public key set P K ∗ ⊂ P K where P K ∗ is of size l,
with the restriction that pkRi ∈ P K ∗ does not exist in the list
LCR . For notational convenience, let L∗ be an index set such
that {Yi }i∈L = P K ∗ . At this stage algorithm B submits L∗
and receives {Zk }k∈L∗ . Algorithm B’s task is to distinguish
if Zk = ê(g, ĝ)abk c for all k ∈ L∗ . To create the challenge
ciphertext with this problem instance, algorithm B
•

•
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If Zk = ê(g, ĝ)abk c , the simulation is perfect and
algorithm A must satisfy |Pr[γ = γ ′ ]| = 1/2 + ϵ. On the other
hand, if Zk ∈R GT , the challenge ciphertext C ∗ contains
no information on γ and thus Pr[γ = γ ′ ] = 1/2. The overall
probability that algorithm B solves the X-DBDH problem
correctly is thus 1/2 + ϵ/2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2: The above scheme is anonymous assuming that
the (t, ϵ) Decisional X-BDH assumption holds in (G, Ĝ).
Proof: Suppose there exists a (t, ϵ)-algorithm A against
the confidentiality of our gateway-based verifiable and
anonymous broadcast scheme. Algorithm A may get the help
from gateway G and qT corrupted receivers. The former will
give its public and private key pair (pkG , skG ) and answer
the Gateway_Corrupt query on the public key sets P K =
{pkRi }i∈L , and the latter will answer the Receiver_Corrupt
query on pkRi .
Thus, we construct an algorithm B that solves the
Decisional (t, ϵ) X-BDH problem. Specifically, algorithm B
is given (g, g a , {g bi }i∈[n] , ĝ, ĝ a , ĝ c , ODL ) and the definition
of G, Ĝ, GT together with the bilinear map ê as the problem
instance. Recalled that at some point algorithm B have to
output a set L∗ ⊂ [n] and receives a set {Zk }k∈L∗ . We
defer the description of this step later. Based on the problem
instance, B creates the system parameter as follows.

selects a random bit γ ∈ {0, 1}, set C2∗ = g a , and
computes, for all i ∈ L∗ ,

Initialisation. The same in Theorem 1.

∗
∗
= ê(g a , ĝ c )x · ê(g a , ĝ c )ri .
= Mγ∗ · Zi , C3,i
C1,i

Phase 2. The same in Theorem 1.

∗
responds with the challenge ciphertext C ∗ = (C1,i
, C2∗ ,
∗
C3,i ).

For all k ∈ L∗ , if Zk = ê(g, ĝ)abk c , we have
∗
= Mγ∗ · Zk = Mγ∗ · ê(g bk , ĝ c )a
C1,k
∗
C3,k

= Mγ∗ · ê(Yi , ĝ ′ )a ,
= ê(g a , ĝ c )x · ê(g a , ĝ c )rk

Phase 1. The same in Theorem 1.
Challenge. Algorithm A outputs a message M ∗ ∈ GT , and
two public key sets P K0∗ , P K1∗ ⊂ P K with the restriction
that pkRi ∈ P K0∗ ∪ P K1∗ does not exist in the list LCR , where
P K0∗ , P K1∗ are of the same size l. For notational convenience,
let L∗ be an index set such that {Yi }i∈L = P K0∗ ∪ P K1∗ . At
this stage algorithm B submits L∗ and receives {Zk }k∈L∗ .
Algorithm B’s task is to distinguish if Zk = ê(g, ĝ)abk c for all
k ∈ L∗ . To create the challenge ciphertext with this problem
instance, algorithm B

= ê(g x , ĝ ′ )a · ê(g bk , (ĝ c )rk /bk )a
= ê(X, ĝ ′ )a · ê(Yk , ĝ ′rk )a

•

= ê(X, ĝ ′ )a · ê(Yk , H1 (IDk ))a .

chooses two identity token sets
S0∗ , S1∗ ⊂ {ID1 , . . . , IDn } of equal size l

•

selects a random bit γ ∈ {0, 1}, sets C2∗ = g1 = g a , and
computes, for all i ∈ L∗

Hence, when Zk = ê(g, ĝ)abk c , meaning that algorithm B’s
input is sampled from PXBDH , then C ∗ is a valid encryption
of Mγ∗ under the public key set P Kγ∗ chosen by algorithm A.
On the other hand, when Zk is uniform and independent in GT ,
meaning that algorithm B’s input is sampled from RXBDH ,
then C ∗ is independent of γ in the view of Algorithm A.
Phase 3. Algorithm A continues to adaptively query pkRi
to Receiver_Corrupt oracle with the restriction that pkRi ∈
/
P K ∗ . Algorithm B responds as in Phase 1.
Guess. Finally, algorithm A outputs a guess γ ′ ∈ {0, 1}. If
γ = γ ′ , algorithm B outputs 1 meaning it wins the game.
Otherwise, it outputs 0.

∗
∗
C1,i
= M ∗ · Zi , C3,i
= ê(g a , ĝ c )x · ê(g a , ĝ c )ri

•

∗
responds with the challenge ciphertext C ∗ = (C1,i
, C2∗ ,
∗
C3,i ).

For all k ∈ L∗ , if Zk = ê(g, ĝ)abk c , we have
∗
C1,k
= M ∗ · Zk = M ∗ · ê(g bk , ĝ c )a
= M ∗ · ê(Yi , ĝ ′ )a ,
∗
C3,k
= ê(g a , ĝ c )x · ê(g a , ĝ c )rk

= ê(g x , ĝ ′ )a · ê(g bk , (ĝ c )rk /bk )a
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= ê(X, ĝ ′ )a · ê(Yk , ĝ ′rk )a
= ê(X, ĝ ′ )a · ê(Yk , H1 (IDk ))a .

where IDi ∈ Sγ∗ and Yi ∈ P Kγ∗ .
Hence, when Zk = ê(g, ĝ)abk c , meaning that algorithm B’s
input is sampled from PXBDH , then C ∗ is a valid encryption
of M ∗ under the public key set P Kγ∗ chosen by algorithm A.
On the other hand, when Zk is uniform and independent in GT ,
meaning that algorithm B’s input is sampled from RXBDH ,
then C ∗ is independent of γ in the view of algorithm A.
Phase 3. Algorithm A continues to adaptively query pkRi
to Receiver_Corrupt oracle with the restriction that pkRi ∈
/
P K0∗ ∪ P K1∗ . Algorithm B responds as in Phase 1.
Guess. Finally, algorithm A outputs a guess γ ′ ∈ {0, 1}. If
γ = γ ′ , algorithm B outputs 1 meaning it wins the game.
Otherwise, it outputs 0.
If Zk = ê(g, ĝ)abk c , the simulation is perfect and
algorithm A must satisfy |Pr[γ = γ ′ ]| = 1/2 + ϵ. On the other
hand, if Zk ∈R GT , the challenge ciphertext C ∗ contains
no information on γ and thus Pr[γ = γ ′ ] = 1/2. The overall
probability that algorithm B solves the X-DBDH problem
correctly is thus 1/2 + ϵ/2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
IND-CCA2 Secure Scheme. The result of Boneh and Katz
(2005) can be applied to the above IND-CPA secure scheme,
thus we can obtain a new scheme that is provably IND-CCA2
secure in random oracle by just making MACi = H(IDi ∥
M ∥ C3,i ) as the addition to the ciphertext where IDi is the
identity token in the privileged receiver set. The only problem
here is that the size of MACi is linear to the size of privileged
receivers.

5 Conclusions and open problems
In this paper, we introduce a new primitive called gatewaybased verifiable and anonymous broadcast encryption, which
is a combination of verifiable encryption and anonymous
broadcast encryption but we authorise an un-trusted gateway
to verify whether the privileged receivers of an inbound
ciphertext belong to the organisation without leaking the
information of plaintext and privileged receivers. In order to
solve such a problem, we propose a new notion: public key
encryption and identity search (PKEIS), which is enlightened
from private information retrieval (PIR) (Chor et al., 1995) and
public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) (Boneh
et al., 2004). In PKEIS, the gateway stores all the trapdoors
generated by receivers, and when it receives an inbound
ciphertext, it decides to broadcast it or not by verifying
this ciphertext with the stored trapdoors and its private key.
Our proposed security model for a gateway-based verifiable
and anonymous broadcast encryption system achieves good
security, through which the gateway can complete verification
without learning anything about the plaintext and the personal
information of receivers even if it colludes with corrupted
receivers. We also provide a concrete implementation of this
new notion based on bilinear pairing and prove its security in

the random oracle model. Although our construction is based
on bilinear pairings, it is very efficient because encryption
needs no pairing computation while decryption only needs one
pairing computation.
In our proposed scheme, the size of ciphertext is linear to
the number n of privileged receivers as 2 · n + 1. Hence, we
leave as an open problem the question of building a gatewaybased verifiable and anonymous broadcast encryption system
which is CPA or CCA2 secure with shorter size or constant size
of the ciphertext in random oracle model or standard model.
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